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Blood donations are increasingly important for medical procedures, while meet-
ing demand is challenging. This paper studies the role of spillovers arising from
social interactions in the context of voluntary blood donations. We analyze a large-
scale intervention among pairs of blood donors who live at the same street address.
A quasi-random phone call provides the instrument for identifying the extent to
which the propensity to donate spills over within these pairs. Spillovers transmit
41% to 46% of the behavioral impulse from one donor to the peer. This creates a sig-
nificant social multiplier, ranging between 1.7 and 1.85. There is no evidence that
these spillovers lead to intertemporal substitution. Taken together, our findings
indicate that policy interventions have a substantially larger effect when targeted
towards pairs instead of isolated individuals.
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1 Introduction
Blood donations are increasingly important for medical procedures (World Health Orga-
nization 2011; Slonim, Wang and Garbarino 2014). However, concerns have been raised
that the future demand for blood transfusion may not be met, mainly due to the ageing
of the general population (Currie et al. 2004; Ali, Auvinen and Rautonen 2010; Volken
et al. 2018). Blood bank’s shortages often delay certain surgeries, which can increase the
costs to the healthcare system later on (Erickson et al. 2008). Even predictable (e.g. sea-
sonal) shortages can affect routine care of clinic patients and a variety of inpatient needs
(Beliën and Forcé 2012). Paying directly for blood donations is generally not considered
as a viable means for increasing turnout and is strongly opposed by the World Health
Organization (2010). Therefore, blood transfusion services largely rely on voluntary do-
nations. This invites the question of how voluntary blood donors can be motivated to
increase turnout.1
This paper studies spillovers in the propensity to donate within pairs of blood donors
who share the same address. In particular, we explore the extent to which such spillovers
are driven by motivational complementarities. Similar to the Battle of the Sexes game,
motivational complementarities within these pairs of donors could emerge from various
mechanisms, such as enjoyment of shared experiences, cost reductions due to shared
transportation, image motivation, or peer pressure. Each of these mechanisms shares
the feature that the (net) benefit from donating increases for the focal donor if the peer
donates. As we show in an analytical example in the Appendix, this creates a motivational
complementarity: if one donor becomes more motivated to donate, this also makes the
peer more likely to donate. This, in turn, affects the focal donor again, producing a
“social multiplier”, akin to a Keynesian consumption multiplier that amplifies the effect
of the original intervention.
We use data from the Blood Transfusion Service of the Red Cross in Zurich, Switzer-
land (BTSRC) on donors who are pre-registered in the same blood drives. This allows us
to analyse social interactions among pairs of donors who live at the same street address
and are likely to exhibit strong social ties.2 Our sample consists of 5,053 pairs of donors
1Several studies examine the impacts of offering cash-like incentives such as gift cards (Ferrari et al.
1985; Lacetera, Macis and Slonim 2012a; Niessen-Ruenzi, Weber and Becker 2014), or other material
incentives like t-shirts (Reich et al. 2006) or health tests (Goette et al. 2009). They find that, in general,
offering material incentives increases blood donations. Other interventions, such as pointing out the
scarcity of a certain blood type in a personal phone call (Bruhin et al. 2015) or through text messages
(Sun, Lu and Jin 2016), as well as highlighting the emphatic motive in a personal phone call (Reich
et al. 2006) are also highly effective. See Goette, Stutzer and Frey (2010) or Lacetera, Macis and Slonim
(2013) for a more extensive review.
2Note that the address only allows us to determine whether the individuals live in the same building
with a given house number, but not whether they actually live in the same flat or different flats within
the same apartment building. Thus, our sample may consist of a large proportion of couples and the
magnitude and nature of spillovers may differ substantially from those arising between people who are
more remotely connected.
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who were repeatedly invited to blood drives over the sample period from April 2011 to
January 2013, leading to 13,421 pair-observations. All donors received a personalized
invitation letter several weeks ahead of the upcoming blood drive and a text message
reminder on her cell phone a day before the event.
Identifying spillovers in the propensity to donate within these pairs of donors is diffi-
cult, as simply observing a correlation in behavior within them is not necessarily evidence
of such spillovers (Manski 2000; Durlauf 2002; Graham 2016). First of all, pairs are en-
dogenously formed. Thus, both donors may share similar characteristics and can be
exposed to similar environments affecting their propensity to donate. Furthermore, the
presence of spillovers itself creates an endogeneity problem known as the reflection prob-
lem (Manski 1993), as motivational complementarities feed back and forth between the
donors.
In order to overcome these challenges, we use a randomized phone call as an instrument.
The phone call targets a random subset of donors whose blood type is currently in short
supply. All these donors were previously invited to blood drives through the invitation
letters and text messages. The phone call reaches them two days before the upcoming
blood drive and encourages them to donate by explaining that their blood type is currently
in short supply.
The phone call satisfies two properties that make it a valid instrument. First, it
directly increases the recipient’s propensity to donate (Bruhin et al. 2015). As the phone
call is randomized conditional on blood types, it is exogenous to the recipient’s baseline
propensity to donate and her other characteristics. In addition, it leaves the peer’s
propensity to donate and characteristics unaffected, unless the donors within the pair
interact. It is important to note that the phone call takes place after the invitation letter
and before the text message. Thus, it only explicitly conveys the additional information
about the scarcity of the particular recipient’s blood type.
To estimate the spillovers in the propensity to donate, we apply a linear-in-means
model (Manski 1993; Graham and Hahn 2005) in a bivariate probit specification.3 The
empirical model allows us to distinguish the spillovers arising from endogenous social
interactions within the pairs from exogenous social interactions and potential correlations
in unobservable characteristics that may also affect donations.
We find strong evidence for spillovers in the propensity to donate within the pairs of
donors. Calling up the donor raises her propensity to donate by roughly 11 percentage
points (over a baseline of roughly 30 percentage points). The phone call also raises her
peer’s propensity to donate by 5 percentage points. These findings imply that 46% of
the motivational impulse spills over to the peer. The finding is robust across different
specifications.
3We also present a simple theoretical model to illustrate how spillovers can increase blood donations
and how it is mapped to our empirical setup in Section A.1 in the Appendix.
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In the context of voluntary blood donations, Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (2014) provide
compelling evidence of social interactions taking place among donors. In their setting,
they announce to a subset of blood donors that they will be given a stored-value card
if they donate blood. Interestingly, they find that a treatment effect also percolates to
other donors who were not made aware of the incentives, pointing to the transmission
of information about these incentives as the driver of the social interactions.4 In our
setting, however, there is no such information about incentives that can be transmitted.
The phone call only conveys information about the scarcity of recipient-specific blood
types among otherwise equally well-informed donors.
Our setting allows us to test whether the phone call perhaps also transmits information
about i) the scarcity of a particular blood type, or ii) the blood drive per se, within pairs.
First, we examine whether a phone call to a focal donor also affects the peer’s propensity
to donate if they have incompatible blood types. If it were exclusively the information
about the temporary shortage of a specific blood type that is transmitted, the effect
should be absent for a peer with an incompatible blood type, or at least significantly
weaker: if the peer’s blood type is incompatible with the one in short supply, donating
her blood does not help to reduce that particular shortage. Therefore, she should not
react to the information of the phone call as strongly as a peer with a compatible blood
type. However, we find the same effect as the peers with compatible blood types.5 Second,
we check whether a phone call to a peer simply serves as a reminder of the blood drive.
In this case, the peer’s phone call should have less of an effect on the focal donor if the
focal donor received a phone call as well. But we find no evidence thereof.
In addition to the testable predictions regarding the peer’s behavior, our model also
predicts that the focal donor’s response to a phone call is amplified by motivational
complementarities. Our estimates imply that, in the absence of a peer, the phone call
would only raise donations by 7.8 percentage points, instead of the 11 percentage points
we observe in our sample. This lower estimate of the effectiveness on an “isolated” donor
matches exactly the estimates in Bruhin et al. (2015) on a sample of mostly unconnected
donors. Thus, motivational complementarities can account for, both, the impact of the
phone call on a peer, and the amplification of the focal donor’s response to the phone
call.
Spillovers emerging from motivational complementarities lead to a social multiplier
that alters the cost-benefit calculations of policy interventions. The estimates of our
baseline specification indicate that 46 percent of the initial impulse from the phone call
spills over to the peer. In turn, 46 percent of that increase in the peer’s motivation
4Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (2014) write “Informing individuals of rewards through official ARC
channels led others who were not officially informed of the rewards (including active, lapsed, and new
donors) to be more likely to donate.” (p. 1108)
5This test yields the same result if we use the same blood types, instead of compatible blood types,
as, arguably, not all donors are aware of the compatibility between blood types.
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spills back to the focal donor, and so on. The resulting feedback loop amplifies the effect
of the phone call by 1/(1 − 0.462) for the focal donor, and by 0.46/(1 − 0.462) for the
peer. Overall, the resulting social multiplier is the sum of the two, and corresponds
to 1/(1 − 0.46) = 1.85. Even in our strictest specification, we find that 41 percent of
the propensity to donate spills over to the peer, yielding a lower-bound multiplier of
1/(1− 0.41) = 1.7. Thus, spillovers emerging from motivational complementarities raise
the effectiveness of policy interventions by 70 to 85 percent. This demonstrates that
behavioral interventions have a substantially larger effect when targeted towards pairs
instead of isolated donors.6 Moreover, there is no evidence that these spillovers lead to
intertemporal substitution. Donors whose peers were called up at the last blood drive do
not show any tendency to reduce blood donations in the current drive.
Taking into account the spillovers arising from motivational complementarities is par-
ticularly important in the context of voluntary blood donations, where more is not always
better. Blood products have a limited shelf life (42-49 days for red blood cells in our sam-
ple) and disposal is costly (Garbarino et al. 2017). Hence, accounting for such spillovers
should allow blood transfusion services to better align supply with demand.
Apart from the literature on blood donation cited earlier, our study also contributes
to the broader literature on identifying endogenous social interaction and highlights the
importance of social multipliers in various contexts. For example, Cipollone and Rosolia
(2007) find strong social interactions within high schools, where an increment in the
boys’ graduation rate leads to an increase in the girls’ graduation rate. Similarly, Lalive
and Cattaneo (2009) conclude that when a child stays longer in school, his friends stay
longer too. Borjas and Doran (2015) discover strong knowledge spillovers in collaboration
spaces when high-quality researchers directly engage with other researchers in the joint
production of new knowledge. Finally, Kessler (2013) shows in an experimental study
that subjects making non-binding announcements of their contributions to a public good
motivate other subjects to contribute as well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical set-up. Section 3
presents our econometric analysis. Section 4 discusses the results and some extensions.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Empirical Setup
This section explains the origin and structure of the panel data set, how we isolate pairs
of donors with potential social interactions, and the phone call we use as the instrument
6We also explore the role of the nonlinearity in the bivariate probit model by re-estimating our model
by two-stage least squares (TSLS). Although the models differ slightly in their interpretations, we also
find significant spillover effects in the TSLS specification, and virtually the same implied social multiplier.
The results can be found in Section A.2 in the Appendix.
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for identifying spillovers in the propensity to donate.
2.1 Origin and Structure of the Data
Our data comprises donors with blood types A-, A+, O-, and O+ who are registered in
the BTSRC’s database because they donated at least once prior to our study. Since their
blood types are in high demand, the BTSRC invites them regularly to blood drives.7
The BTSRC uses the following invitation procedure. For each upcoming blood drive,
it sends a personalized invitation letter to all eligible donors in its database, i.e. those
who did not donate within the past three months and meet all other donation criteria.
The letters are mailed several weeks ahead of the blood drive. In addition, all invited
donors receive a text message one day ahead of the blood drive, reminding them of the
upcoming event. Over the study period from April 2011 to January 2013, each registered
donor received between 1 to 8 such invitations.
The invitations constitute the unit of observation in our panel data set. For each of
them, we observe: a binary indicator on whether the donor made a donation at the blood
drive she was invited to, her street (in acronymized form), house number, and zip code,
as well as her age, gender, blood type, and the number of donations she made in the year
prior to the study. Moreover, we also observe whether the donor additionally received a
phone call, informing her that her blood type is currently in short supply. Panel A of
Table 1 shows that the raw data set contains 121,586 such observations stemming from
39,417 donors. The average age of all donors is 43.4 years, and 56.2 percent of them are
male. On average, these donors made 0.312 donation per invitation and 0.893 donations
in the year before our study.
2.2 Pairs of Donors
To test for spillovers in the propensity to donate, we isolate pairs of donors who share
the same street address. They live either as couples or as flat mates in the same dwelling
or as neighbors in the same apartment building. There are two advantages of focusing
on pairs of donors. First, by eliminating groups of donors who live in large, anonymous
apartment buildings, it maximizes the chance that the two donors know each other and
exhibit strong social ties. Second, it allows us to apply a bivariate probit model which
is often used for estimating the effect of an endogenous binary regressor on a binary
outcome variable (Abadie 2000; Angrist 2001; Winkelmann 2012).
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the data set contains 13,421 observations from 5,053
such pairs of donors. The descriptive statistics of the donors in these pairs are similar to
7Blood drives are regular events that typically take place twice a year at which donations can be made.
They are coordinated by local organizations such as church chapters or sports clubs, but organized
centrally by the BTSRC which administers the invitation of donors and provides the equipment and
personnel to draw blood.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of donations
Panel A: Universe of donors
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Donation per invitation 0.312 0.464
Age 43.402 13.365
Male 0.562 0.496
Donations in year before study 0.893 0.832
# of individual donors 39, 417
# of individual observations 121, 586
Panel B: Pairs of donors
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Donation per invitation 0.325 0.468
Age 42.457 13.093
Male 0.521 0.500
Donations in year before study 0.919 0.825
# of pairs 5, 053
# of pair-observations 13, 421
# of individual observations 26, 842
those of all donors in the sample: on average, 32.5% of the invitations led to a donation,
the donors are 42.457 years old, 52.1% of them are male, and they made 0.919 donations
in the year prior to the study. About 74 percent of the pairs are opposite-gender. This
suggests that couples make up a significant proportion of our sample.8
Table 2 shows the correlation of donation decisions within pairs of donors. Panel A
shows that given that the peer donates, in about 54 percent of the cases the focal donor
donates as well. If the peer does not donate, the focal donor donates only in 22 percent
of the cases. Panel B illustrates this correlation from a different angle, i.e., by looking at
the joint distribution of donations within pairs: 17.5% of all pair-observations exhibit two
8One may suspect that most of the spillovers we identify in this study originate from the couples in
our data set, who arguably have much stronger social ties than the other cohabiting tenants. This would
result in latent behavioral heterogeneity as the group of couples would exhibit stronger spillovers than the
group of cohabiting tenants. However, we find no evidence for such latent behavioral heterogeneity. A
finite mixture model fails to uncover any groups of donors that differ in the strength of their spillovers (see
Appendix A.3 for further details). Thus, the couples and the other cohabiting tenants exhibit spillovers
of similar strength, and our results are not purely driven by the couples. This may be explained by
the couples’ self-selection to be similar, meaning that even if spillovers were generally stronger among
them, we may not necessarily observe them, as their behavior is already more aligned than among other
cohabiting tenants. Nevertheless, the magnitude and nature of the social spillovers in our settings likely
differ substantially from those arising between people who are more remotely connected.
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Table 2: Distribution of donations within pairs
Panel A: Donation rate of a focal donor conditional on whether the peer donates
Peer does not donate Peer donates
Donation rate of the focal donor 22.20% 53.87%
Panel B: Distribution of donations within pairs
Both donate One donates Nobody donates
Donation (1,1) (1,0) & (0,1) (0,0)
Empirical distribution: 17.50% 29.98% 52.52%
Distribution under independence: 10.56% 43.86% 45.58%
χ2-test for independent donations within pairs: p < 0.001
donations, 30% show one donation, and 52.5% have no donations. Note that there are
significantly more pair-observations with either both donors or no donor donating than
expected under independence (χ2-test for independent donations within pairs, p-value ≤
0.001). Thus, donations within pairs are significantly positively correlated.
2.3 Instrument for Identification
Besides the regular invitation procedure, the BTSRC applies a phone call to a random
subset of invited donors to increase turnout for blood types that are in short supply.
Depending on the daily inventory in its blood stock, which is subject to random fluctua-
tions in supply and demand, the BTSRC determines which of the blood types, A-, A+,
O-, or O+, are in short supply. Subsequently, it uses a software to put a random subset
of invited donors with matching blood types on a call list two days ahead of the blood
drive.9 The phone call informs the donors that their respective blood types are currently
in short supply and encourages them to make a donation at the upcoming blood drive
they are invited to. It is administered during office hours to the donors’ cell phones and
the voice message reads: “Your blood type X is in short supply, please come and donate
at the upcoming blood drive.”
Figure 1 illustrates how the invitation procedure and the randomized phone call result
in a quasi-experimental design. In step A, all registered donors who are eligible for
donation receive a personalized invitation letter several weeks before the blood drive. In
step B, if the invited donors’ blood types are in particularly short supply two days before
9We apply a strict intention-to-treat (ITT) methodology regarding the phone call: we only consider
whether a call to the donor was attempted, not whether the call was answered in person, whether a
message was left on the answering machine, or whether the call went unnoticed. This ITT approach only
affects the interpretation of the direct effect of the phone call, but not the identification of the spillovers.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the quasi-experimental design
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the phone call
Mean Std. Dev.
Phone call 0.079 0.269
Share of pair-observations without phone call 85.72%
Share of pair-observations with 1 phone call 12.85%
Share of pair-observations with 2 phone calls 1.44%
Correlation of phone calls within pairs 0.113
# of pair-observations 13, 421
the blood drive, they are randomly allocated to a treatment group receiving the phone
call. Finally, in step C, one day before the blood drive takes place, all invited donors –
regardless of whether they received the phone call or not – get a text message on their cell
phones reminding them about the upcoming blood drive. It is important to notice that
the phone call (step B) occurs between the invitation letter (step A) and the text message
reminder (step C). Thus, the phone call contains no additional information about blood
donations or blood drives beyond what is already mentioned in the invitation letter and
the text message reminder.
As reported in Table 3, the incidence of the phone call among individual observations
is 7.9%. Both donors received the phone call in 1.4% of the pair-observations, only one
donor received the phone call in 12.9% of the pair-observations, and none of the donors
received the phone call in 85.7% of the pair-observations. The phone calls are barely
correlated within the pairs.
To be a valid instrument for identifying spillovers in the propensity to donate, the
phone call needs to satisfy the exclusion restriction. Thus, we need to assert that the
phone call is exogenous with respect to the peer’s propensity to donate. In other words,
a phone call to a donor must not affect the peer’s propensity to donate directly, but only
indirectly via its impact on the focal donor’s propensity to donate. This is guaranteed
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by the institutional set-up. The BTSRC reaches the donors during office hours on their
cell phones. Thus, the phone call cannot affect the peer who is most likely not present
at that time.10
As mentioned before, the phone call is randomized conditional on the donors’ blood
types. We now verify that the randomization is well-balanced. Columns 1-3 in Table 4
show the randomization checks in the sample we use for the analyses, with increasing
numbers of fixed effects. Columns 4-6 show the randomization checks separately for
each blood type. All columns confirm that, conditional on blood types, the phone call
is not correlated with other individual characteristics. The correlations of the phone
call with gender and age are tiny and insignificant. Most importantly, the phone call is
uncorrelated with the donation histories in the year prior to the study of both the focal
donors as well as their peers. The corresponding coefficients are jointly insignificant in
every specification.
2.4 Descriptive Evidence
In this subsection, we first provide some descriptive evidence of the phone call’s effects
on donors’ propensity to donate. Subsequently, we use these effects to compute the Wald
estimator that isolates the extent to which the propensity to donate spills over within
pairs of donors. Hence, the analysis in this subsection illustrates the key feature in our
data that will later drive the identification in the econometric model. Notice that, in
contrast to the econometric model, it neglects control variables and the standard errors
do not take into account that each pair is observed multiple times.
Figure 2 shows the average effect of the phone call on donation rates. It provides
a first glimpse at the direct effect and reduced-form effect of the phone call on donors’
motivation. Panel a) exhibits the average change in the focal donors’ donation frequency
if they receive a phone call: The donation frequency is 31 percent for donors who do not
receive a phone call, and increases by 13 percentage points if they get a call. This is
the direct effect of the phone call on donors’ prosocial motivation. Panel b) exhibits the
average change in the focal donors’ donation frequency if their peers receive a phone call:
it increases by roughly 5 percentage points, with the confidence intervals sufficiently far
apart to suggest a significant relationship. This is the reduced-form effect of the peer’s
phone call on the focal donor’s propensity to donate.
We can now obtain an estimate of the spillovers in the propensity to donate between the
recipient of the phone call and the peer by applying the Wald estimator, i.e., we calculate
10Notice that our instrument only enables us to identify the spillovers within pre-existing pairs. In-
tuitively, our empirical strategy takes the social connection as given and examines how the behavioral
impulse of the phone call feeds through it. An equally interesting, but distinct, research question would
be to examine how the formation of pairs affects behavior. However, this is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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Table 4: Randomization checks of the phone call
Binary dependent variable: Received a phone call
OLS Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All sampled blood types O- O+ A-
Focal donor’s characteristics
Male 0.00131 0.000387 0.000330 0.0165 -0.00231 0.00690
(0.00285) (0.00267) (0.00267) (0.0134) (0.00169) (0.00853)
Age 5.26e-05 2.84e-05 2.70e-05 -0.000253 2.81e-05 0.000691*
(8.84e-05) (8.54e-05) (8.52e-05) (0.000406) (6.42e-05) (0.000372)
# of donations in year before study†
1 -0.00308 -0.00400 -0.00190 -0.0122 -0.000547 -0.0134
(0.00273) (0.00269) (0.00270) (0.0129) (0.00191) (0.0104)
2 -0.00690* -0.00711** -0.00615* -0.00344 -0.00151 -0.0163
(0.00357) (0.00349) (0.00349) (0.0154) (0.00198) (0.0123)
3 0.00421 0.00321 0.00380 -0.00209 0.00101 -0.0299
(0.00858) (0.00830) (0.00822) (0.0272) (0.00493) (0.0182)
4 0.0356 0.0395 0.0347 0.0398
(0.0508) (0.0475) (0.0453) (0.0419)
Blood types
O- 0.687*** 0.684*** 0.684***
(0.0106) (0.00981) (0.00978)
A+ -0.0111*** -0.0101*** -0.00993***
(0.00112) (0.00131) (0.00131)
A- 0.212*** 0.211*** 0.210***
(0.00932) (0.00859) (0.00852)
Peer’s characteristics
Male 0.00108 0.000156 9.89e-05 0.0157 -0.00221 0.00292
(0.00285) (0.00267) (0.00267) (0.0141) (0.00167) (0.00927)
Age -1.47e-05 -3.89e-05 -4.03e-05 0.000555 0.000111* -0.000243
(9.17e-05) (8.85e-05) (8.82e-05) (0.000376) (6.41e-05) (0.000342)
# of donations in year before study††
1 -0.00309 -0.00401 -0.00192 -0.0154 -0.00279 0.00432
(0.00284) (0.00277) (0.00276) (0.0131) (0.00185) (0.00992)
2 -0.00311 -0.00332 -0.00237 0.00473 -0.00145 -0.00188
(0.00347) (0.00343) (0.00342) (0.0155) (0.00194) (0.0123)
3 0.00581 0.00481 0.00540 -0.000881 0.00463 0.00512
(0.00733) (0.00731) (0.00726) (0.0230) (0.00458) (0.0202)
4 -0.0351* -0.0312 -0.0360 0.00122
(0.0212) (0.0232) (0.0244) (0.00236)
Blood types
O- 0.0124** 0.0100* 0.0101*
(0.00576) (0.00557) (0.00556)
A+ -0.00246 -0.00143 -0.00130
(0.00254) (0.00243) (0.00242)
A- -0.00298 -0.00434 -0.00479
(0.00565) (0.00551) (0.00550)
Constant 0.0145*** 0.0161*** 0.0139*** 0.695*** 0.0155*** 0.227***
(0.00384) (0.00364) (0.00359) (0.0165) (0.00235) (0.0131)
F-test for joint significance (p-value):
† Own donation history dummies 0.282 0.201 0.359 0.774 0.800 0.329
†† Peer’s donation history dummies 0.284 0.312 0.466 0.485 0.303 0.948
174 Location FEs? no yes yes yes yes yes
20 Month FEs? no no yes yes yes yes
# of individual observations 26,842 26,842 26,842 2,120 11,000 2,234
R-squared 0.507 0.526 0.539 0.508 0.296 0.569
Household cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Age normalized to sample average. The reference group consists of Female, 0 donations in the year before the study, and blood type O+.
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Figure 2: The Wald estimator of spillovers in the propensity to donate: donation
frequency as function of the own phone call (panel a) and the peer’s phone call (panel
b). Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
the ratio between the phone call’s reduced-form effect and its direct effect, which amounts
to roughly 5%/13% = 38%.11 This suggests that spillovers play an important role in pairs
of donors. In each round, about 38% of a given change in the recipient’s propensity to
donate spills over to her peer.
3 Econometric Analysis
This section presents the econometric analysis of identifying spillovers in the propensity to
donate. We first introduce the structural model, then formally discuss the identification
strategy, and finally outline the estimation procedure.
3.1 Structural Model
In the structural model, the propensity of donor i in pair p to donate blood is






2X−ip + εip . (3.1)
For notational convenience, we drop the subscript t for the invitation to an upcoming
blood drive at time t in this subsection. β0 is a constant, measuring the baseline motiva-
tion to donate. The key term in the model is the spillover parameter δ of the propensity
to donate Y ∗−ip of the peer. In Appendix A.1, we provide a microfoundation for this
structural model. We consider a simultaneous-move game of the pair, fashioned after the
11The Wald estimator ω of an endogenous regressor si using the binary instrument zi is given by
ω = E[yi|zi=1]−E[yi|zi=0]E[si|zi=1]−E[si|zi=0] (Angrist and Pischke 2008).
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Battle of the Sexes game, in which there is a motivational complementarity: the benefit
from donating to the focal donor i increases if the peer −i donates. This complementarity
could arise from enjoyment of shared experiences, reduced transportation cost, peer pres-
sure, or image motivation. As we show, in equilibrium, donors act as if there was a direct
spillover where Y ∗−ip enters the utility function as described in Equation 3.1. We refer to
these mechanisms summarily as “motivational complementarities” as they all share the
property that they generate a policy multiplier of the same structure. The vector Xip
represents donor i’s characteristics, including her gender, age, blood type, and dummies
for the number of donations she made during the year prior to the study. The vector
X−ip includes the same set of characteristics of i’s peer.
Since the decision on whether or not to donate, Yip, is binary and we study pairs of
donors, we can estimate a bivariate probit model to capture the simultaneous decision-
making of the two donors in each pair as in Equations 3.2 and 3.3.






2X2p + ε1p (3.2)






2X1p + ε2p (3.3)
Y1p = 1 if Y
∗
1p > 0, and Y1p = 0 otherwise
Y2p = 1 if Y
∗
2p > 0, and Y2p = 0 otherwise
We assume the random errors ε1p and ε2p to be bivariate normally distributed, with
E(ε1p) = E(ε2p) = 0, Var(ε1p) = Var(ε2p) = 1, and Cor(ε1p, ε2p) = ρ. The correlation
between the random errors, ρ, captures potentially omitted exogenous effects, such as
health status and education, as well as correlated effects, such as sharing a common
environment.




































The equations highlight the identification problem: we have three independent vari-
ables (the constant, X1p, and X2p), but four unknown parameters (β0, β1, β2, and δ).
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12If we assumed that ρ = 0, then the functional form induced by the normality assumption over
the errors in the structural form, ε1p and ε2p, would allow us to identify δ. To see why this is true,
note that the error terms in the reduced form, (3.4) and (3.5), are linear combinations of the errors ε1p
and ε2p in the structural form. Thus, when ρ = 0, we could identify δ off the correlation of the error
terms in the reduced form. However, when ρ 6= 0, this in itself introduces a correlation in the errors
in the structural form, leaving δ unidentified. In our context, ρ could reflect omitted exogenous effects
12
3.2 Indentification
The above identification problem can be resolved by using an instrument, in our context,
the phone call discussed in subsection 2.3. Within our model, it takes on the role akin
to an instrument in a TSLS estimation. Denote Pip by the binary variable indicating
whether donor i in pair p received a phone call for the current invitation. As mentioned
above, a critical feature of the phone call is that it directly affects donor i’s propensity
to donate, but not that of her peer. The econometric model then becomes






2X2p + ε1p (3.6)






2X1p + ε2p (3.7)
























Note that, just like in the theoretical model in Section A.1 in the Appendix, the
impact of the phone call P1p on donor 1’s propensity to donate is given by
γ
1−δ2 because
of the spillovers that go back and forth between the two donors: A fraction δ of the initial
impulse to donor 1 also affects donor 2, which in turn feeds back into donor 1’s propensity
to donate, and so on. This amplifies the response to the phone call if 0 < δ < 1. For
donor 2, the overall effect amounts to δ γ
1−δ2 , as only a fraction δ of donor 1’s propensity
to donate spills over to donor 2 (and because donor 1’s phone call has no direct effect
on donor 2’s propensity to donate – this is the exclusion restriction needed to identify
the spillovers). This allows us to identify the parameter δ by dividing the reduced-form
coefficient of donor 2’s phone call by the reduced-form coefficient of donor 1’s phone call.13
Having obtained δ, we can identify all remaining structural parameters: as is obvious from
the reduced form above, all other structural parameters are uniquely identified once δ is
recovered (see Section A.4 in the Appendix on how to recover the structural parameters
and calculate their standard errors).
or unobservable common shocks to the motivation to donate stemming from similar environments, thus
making identification suspect if one imposed ρ = 0 ex-ante.
13Notice also that the fact that γ has an intention-to-treat interpretation is irrelevant for the purposes
of identifying the structural parameter δ.
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3.3 Estimation




2, γ, δ, ρ)
′, using
the method of maximum likelihood. Pair p’s contribution to the model’s density is










where wipt = qiptY
∗
ipt, qipt = 2Yipt − 1, ρ∗ht = q1ptq2ptρpt, and Φ2 is the cumulative distribu-
tion function of the bivariate normal distribution (Greene 2003). Equation 3.9 directly
yields the model’s log likelihood,
lnL(θ;Pp, Xp, Yp) =
∑
p
ln f(θ;Pp, Xp, Yp) . (3.10)
As the Tp observations of pair p may be serially correlated, we estimate pair cluster-
robust standard errors using the sandwich estimator (Huber 1967; Wooldridge 2002). To
control for potential heterogeneity across the locations and months of the blood drives,
we include location and month fixed effects.
4 Results
In this section, we present the results of the econometric analysis. First, we discuss the
estimated coefficients of the bivariate probit model in our baseline specification which
allows us to identify spillovers in the propensity to donate. Subsequently, we show ev-
idence that the spillovers are unlikely to be exclusively driven by the transmission of
information (about the scarcity of a certain blood type or the blood drives) but rather by
motivational complementarities. Finally, we quantify the social multiplier and confirm
that it does not erode over time due to intertemporal substitution effects.
4.1 Estimated Coefficients of the Bivariate Probit Model
Table 5 shows the estimated coefficients for the structural equation in three different
specifications of the bivariate probit model.14 Column (1) shows the estimates of the
specification without fixed effects. Column (2) shows the estimates of the specification
with location fixed effects, while the specification in column (3) additionally controls for
month fixed effects. We add fixed effects to avoid confounds that may arise since the
blood drives took place at different locations and points in time, which may affect both
donors in a pair similarly. The 174 location fixed effects absorb differences between urban
14For first stage F-statistics regarding the strength of the instrument, please refer to the 2SLS specifi-
cation in Appendix A.2.
14
Table 5: Bivariate probit model
Binary dependent variable: donation decision (0,1)
Bivariate probit regression (1) (2) (3)
Phone call (γ) 0.220*** 0.222*** 0.216***
(0.060) (0.061) (0.058)
Spillovers in the propensity to donate (δ) 0.464*** 0.460*** 0.412**
(0.159) (0.163) (0.176)
Constant (β0) -0.537*** -0.686*** -0.678***
(0.160) (0.226) (0.239)
Focal donor’s characteristics (β1)
Male 0.118*** 0.097*** 0.116***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Age 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# of donations in year before study
1 0.529*** 0.551*** 0.560***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
2 0.887*** 0.942*** 0.952***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.035)
3 1.096*** 1.191*** 1.204***
(0.058) (0.063) (0.063)
4 0.901*** 0.997*** 0.989***
(0.113) (0.128) (0.129)
Blood types
O- 0.041 0.042 0.048
(0.054) (0.055) (0.054)
A+ -0.023 -0.021 -0.021
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
A- 0.035 0.048 0.048
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Peer’s characteristics (β2)
Male -0.036 -0.043 -0.037
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Age -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
# donations in year before study
1 -0.261*** -0.259*** -0.226**
(0.086) (0.093) (0.102)
2 -0.415*** -0.398** -0.348**
(0.143) (0.160) (0.174)
3 -0.520*** -0.460** -0.398*
(0.183) (0.212) (0.229)
4 0.391 -0.318 -0.283
(0.314) (0.322) (0.333)
Blood types
O- -0.057 -0.058 -0.049
(0.050) (0.052) (0.054)
A+ 0.009 0.011 0.010
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
A- -0.081** -0.080** -0.076*
(0.037) (0.040) (0.040)
ρ (correlation between errors -0.392 -0.418 -0.321
in the structural form) (0.342) (0.342) (0.380)
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Wald-tests for joint significance (p-values)
Focal donor:
all blood types 0.42 0.37 0.34
negative blood types 0.64 0.49 0.46
non O-negative blood types 0.28 0.22 0.22
Peer:
all characteristics 0.07 0.09 0.14
previous donations 0.06 0.04 0.17
all blood types 0.13 0.16 0.23
negative blood types 0.09 0.12 0.16
174 Location FEs? no yes yes
20 Month FEs? no no yes
# of pairs 5,053 5,053 5,053
# of pair observations 13,421 13,421 13,421
Log likelihood -15,022.06 -14,667.67 -10,884.40
Household cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Age normalized to sample average.
and rural areas as well as differences between the local organizers of the blood drives. The
20 month fixed effects pick up seasonal fluctuations or special events that may influence
donation rates, such as school holidays.
First, we examine the direct effect of the phone call on the probability to donate.
The coefficient γ is positive, and estimated with considerable precision, with a z-statistic
of well above 2. This coefficient represents the impact of the phone call on donor’s
motivation if the donor were not part of a pair. The magnitude of the coefficient alone
cannot be interpreted, but we can calculate the marginal effect of the phone call on the
probability to donate.15 We find that the marginal effect is 8.7 percentage points, which
is very close to the estimate in Bruhin et al. (2015) that uses all donors in the sample.
Thus, focusing on pairs does not appear to lead to a selection of donors who are generally
more receptive to nudges to donate.
Next, we examine the extent of spillovers in the propensity to donate within pairs of
donors, δ. In contrast to the other probit coefficients, δ has an interpretation of a marginal
effect because it is calculated as the ratio of two reduced form parameters.16 It is highly
significant in all three specifications. It is equal to 0.46 in the baseline specification of
column (1). This implies that 46 percent of a one-unit increase in the peer’s propensity
to donate spills over to the other donor in the pair. Hence, a donor’s propensity to donate
blood strongly depends on her peer’s propensity to donate. The estimates are slightly
lower in columns (2) and (3) which also include the location and month fixed effects. But
even in the strictest specification of column (3), the parameter is equal to 0.41, implying
that 41 percent of a peer’s propensity to donate spill over to the other donor in the
pair. We also examine whether the estimate of the social multiplier is sensitive to the
choice of the functional form. In the Appendix A.2, we re-estimate our model as a linear
15We show how we calculate the marginal effect of the probit coefficients in Section A.5 in the Appendix.
16See Appendix A.4 for details.
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probability model, using the phone call to the peer as an instrument for her donation.
The results are virtually identical.
Individual characteristics are strong determinants of the probability to donate. Male
donors are significantly more likely to donate blood than female donors. This gender
difference is robust and quantitatively important. The marginal effect of being male on
the probability to donate is 4.5 percentage points, again an effect that is roughly similar
to the difference found in Bruhin et al. (2015). Donation rates also increase significantly
with age. Increasing age by one year increases the probability to donate by 0.5 percentage
points. This finding is robust across all three specifications and consistent with the result
in many other studies (Wildman and Hollingsworth 2009; Lacetera, Macis and Slonim
2012a, 2014). As in Wildman and Hollingsworth (2009) we find that the number of
donations in the year before entering the study predicts current blood donations: The
coefficients for the number of donations made prior to the study reveal that previous
regular donors are more likely to donate than previous irregular donors. Finally, blood
types have no significant effect on donation rates (Wald-test for joint significance of all
blood types, p > 0.3 in all specifications). In particular, donors with highly demanded,
negative blood types do not donate more frequently (Wald-test for joint significance of
negative blood types, p > 0.4 in all specifications).
There are some negative correlations between peer’s characteristics and the focal
donor’s motivation. While we control for the peer’s characteristics in the regression,
the coefficients of these characteristics do not have a causal interpretation as the pairs
are not randomly assigned.
Finally, the estimates of the correlation of the errors in the structural model, ρ, lie
between −0.32 and −0.42, depending on the specification, and are estimated with little
precision: in each of the specifications, the standard error is roughly 0.4.17
4.2 Motivational Complementarities vs. Transmission of Infor-
mation
Previous studies have concluded that some observed social interaction effects are due
to the transmission of information (Lacetera, Macis and Slonim 2014; Bond et al. 2012;
Drago, Mengel and Traxler 2013). In our context, transmission of information and moti-
vational complementarities are both possible. Spillovers could emerge from the motiva-
tional impulse of the phone call to the peer, as postulated by our econometric model.18
However, it is also possible that the information conveyed by the phone call about the
17However, the results are not sensitive to the estimation of ρ, as in Appendix A.6 we show that the
results remain robust when we restrict ρ to 0. This does not indicate that including ρ is unnecessary as
- ex ante - it is impossible to know whether there is a systematic correlation between the residuals.
18As we mentioned before, motivational complementarities are very broadly defined in our set-up. We
discuss this in more detail in the theoretical model in Appendix A.1.
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blood drive or the scarcity of the specific blood type is transmitted within the pair and
that donors respond to this information.
Fortunately, our set-up allows us to check for the presence of motivational comple-
mentarities besides such an informational channel with two tests. We conduct these tests
in the context of the reduced form of the bivariate probit model since these mechanisms
would invalidate the exclusion restriction needed for the structural model in Section 3.1.
Our first check tests whether the phone call transmits information about the scarcity of
a specific blood type to the other member of the pair. Recall that the phone call is made
as a function of the scarcity of certain blood types, and this information is conveyed
to the potential donors very clearly. If it were information about the scarcity that is
transmitted between donors, then this effect should be stronger if they have compatible
blood types.19 We augment the reduced form in the bivariate probit model by adding the
indicator Cp = 1 if a focal donor’s blood type is compatible with the peer’s blood type,
and Cp = 0 otherwise. We add the interaction between Cp and the peer’s phone call, and
estimate
Y ∗ip = κ0 + κ1Pip + κ2P−ip + κ3Cp + κ4Cp × P−ip + κ′5Xip + κ′6X−ip + uip . (4.1)
If information about the scarcity of the blood type were transmitted between donors, we
would expect κ2 to vanish, or at least diminish relative to the baseline specification, and
κ4 to be significantly positive.
Table 6 displays the results. Columns (1) and (2) show the reduced forms of the
baseline specification with and without the indicator Cp. Column (3), labeled “Test 1a”,
exhibits the estimates of Equation (4.1). As can be seen, the coefficients and standard
errors on one’s own phone call and the peer’s phone call remain virtually unchanged.
Furthermore, the interaction with the compatible blood type to the peer is not statistically
significant. Therefore, there is no evidence that information about the scarcity of the
blood type is transmitted, as donors with incompatible blood types (which are not scarce
at the moment), are no less affected by a phone call to their peers. Arguably, donors
might be less familiar with the compatibility of different blood types than the recognition
of same blood types. Columns (4) and (5) show the same analysis using identical blood
types within pairs (indicated by the binary variable Sp) and its interaction with the peer’s
phone call indicator. The results show again there is no evidence that information about
the specific scarcity of the blood type is transmitted within pairs in a way that affects
donation decisions.
19Compatibility in blood types works as follows. Donors with blood type O are universal donors and
can give to everyone. Donors with blood type A can give to donors with blood types A and AB. Donors
with blood type B can give to donors with blood types B and AB. Donors with blood type AB can only
give to other donors with blood type AB. Regarding the Rh factor, donors with negative blood types
can donate to donors with negative and positive blood types but donors with positive blood types can
only give to other donors with positive blood types.
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Table 6: Bivariate probit model, reduced forms
Binary dependent variable: donation decision (0,1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bivariate probit Original Augmented Test 1a Augmented Test 1b Test 2
regression Model Original Model a Original Model b
(Eq. 3.8) (Eq. 3.8 aug.) (Eq. 4.1) (Eq. 4.2)
P1p 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.269*** 0.261*** 0.259*** 0.263***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.048)
P2p 0.107** 0.107** 0.123** 0.108*** 0.106** 0.111**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.046) (0.048) (0.049)
Cp -0.011 -0.004
(0.041) (0.043)




Sp × P2p 0.015
(0.108)
P1p × P2p -0.017
(0.097)
ρ̄ 0.496*** 0.496*** 0.496*** 0.496*** 0.496*** 0.496***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
# of pairs 5,053 5,053 5,053 5,053 5,053 5,053
# of pair observations 13,421 13,421 13,421 13,421 13,421 13,421
Log likelihood -14,625.78 -14625.72 -14,625.37 -14,624.64 -14,624.63 -14,625.76
Models additionally include reduced form parameters for X1p and X2p and absorb 174 location and 20 month fixed effects.
Pair cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Age normalized to sample average.
The shown variables have the following interpretation: The binary variables P1p and P2p indicate the phone calls to the focal
donor and the peer. The binary variable Cp indicates whether the focal donor’s blood type is compatible to the peer’s blood
type. The binary variable Sp indicates if the focal donor and the peer have the same blood type. ρ̄ is the correlation between
the reduced form error terms.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Our second test is based on the intuition that the phone call to one donor may simply
serve as a reminder of the blood drive to the other donor in the pair. This is possible
despite the fact that it takes place between the invitation letter and the text message
that every invited donor receives. In this case, a phone call to the peer should have less
of an effect on the focal donor if she received a phone call as well. This can be tested by
augmenting the reduced form by an interaction between the two phone calls Pip × P−ip
and the coefficient of the interaction should be significantly negative. Thus, we estimate
the equation
Y ∗ip = ξ0 + ξ1Pip + ξ2P−ip + ξ3Pip × P−ip + ξ′4Xip + ξ′5X−ip + vip . (4.2)
The results of this test are displayed in Column (6), labeled “Test 2” in Table 6. As
can be seen, the point estimate of the coefficient of the peer’s phone call remains positive
and significant. The point estimate of the interaction of the two phone calls is small and
insignificant. Hence, we find no evidence that the phone call merely serves as a reminder
for the blood drive.
In summary, neither form of information transmission (information about scarcity of a
particular blood type or general reminder of the blood drives) can account for our findings
of spillovers in the propensity to donate. We interpret these results as corroboration of
our interpretation of motivational complementarities generating the spillovers.
4.3 The Social Multiplier
Given the significant spillover effects, we now quantify their impact in terms of a multiplier
on a given policy intervention that affects a donor’s propensity to donate. Consider how
the phone call to donor 1 changes her propensity to donate Y ∗1 : its effect depends both
on the phone call, and on the feedback induced by her peer, donor 2. Thus, ∆Y ∗1 =
γ+δ∆Y ∗2 . Similarly, the peer is affected indirectly and her propensity to donate increases
by ∆Y ∗2 = δ∆Y
∗
1 . Solving this system of two equations yields ∆Y
∗
1 = γ/(1 − δ2) and
∆Y ∗2 = γδ/(1 − δ2). Thus, the social amplification is 1/(1 − δ2) for the donor receiving
the call, and a fraction δ of that for the peer, for a total effect of 1/(1− δ2)+ δ/(1− δ2) =
1/(1− δ).
Our baseline estimate of δ = 0.46 implies a substantial social multiplier. The spillovers
amplify the effectiveness of the phone call for the donor called by a factor of 1/(1−0.462) =
1.27 , and therefore by 0.46/(1−0.462) = 0.58 for her peer, donor 2. Overall, this creates
a social multiplier, equal to the sum of the two effects of 1/(1 − 0.46) = 1.85. Even
in the strictest specification, our estimate of δ is 0.41, implying a social multiplier of
1/(1− 0.41) = 1.7.
We now illustrate how the social multiplier increases the effect of a policy intervention,
again using the example of the phone call in our study. Recall that in Section 5.1, we
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pointed out that in the absence of motivational complementarities, a phone call would
increase the propensity to donate by 8.7 percentage points. With our baseline estimate
of δ = 0.46, the spillovers amplify the effect of the phone call on the target donor to 11
percentage points, and also create a spillover, amounting to a 5 percentage points increase
in the probability to donate on the peer. Overall, this results in a 16 percentage points
increase in blood donation.20 Thus, in the absence of such spillovers, the BTSRC would
have to call 1/0.087 ≈ 11 donors to increase expected turnout at the blood drive by 1.
In contrast, if the BTSRC called a member of a pair, only 1/(0.16) ≈ 6 phone calls are
necessary for the same increase.
If the BTSRC is exclusively interested in a particular blood type – as blood transfusions
have a limited shelf life and disposing them is costly (Garbarino et al. 2017) – calculations
would look slightly different. Assume the BTSRC only cares about increasing the turnout
of donors with O-negative blood type who make up just 8% of our sample. As mentioned
before, taking into account the social multiplier, every phone call increases the probability
to donate of the focal donor by 11 percentage points and also increases the probability
to donate of the peer by 5 percentage points. Therefore, in order to increase the turnout
by 10 additional donors with O-negative blood type, assuming that the blood types of
peers are independent, the BTSRC needs to call 10/(0.11+0.08×0.05) ≈ 88 donors with
O-negative blood type. However, at the same time, 88× (1− 0.08)× 0.05 ≈ 4 additional
donors with other blood types will also turn up in response to these 88 phone calls.
The BTSRC should take this into account and adjust its overall recruitment schedule
accordingly.
4.4 Intertemporal Substitution
One potential concern about the robustness of our estimated social multiplier are in-
tertemporal substitution effects. It is conceivable that donations in response to the be-
havior of one’s peer draw on blood donations which that donor would have given in the
future, akin to intertemporal substitution of labor. This would change the interpretation
of the multiplier, as the higher impact today would be offset by a predictable drop in
donations in the future.
We test for intertemporal substitution in the reduced form of the bivariate probit
model by including past phone calls (indexed t− 1) of the focal donor and her peer21,




6X−ip,t + υip,t . (4.3)
20These estimated direct effects of the phone call are much more aligned with previous estimates
among (mostly) unconnected donors (Bruhin et al. 2015), than our naive estimates in Figure 2. Thus,
the estimated magnitude of the social multiplier fits the data remarkably well.
21Estimating the structural model is not feasible because this would mean estimating a multivariate
probit model and would force us to drop almost 40% of the observations due to the need of lagged
donation variables in order to model the intertemporal correlations in residuals.
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Table 7: Long-term effects in the reduced form probit model
Binary dependent variable: donation decision (0,1)
Probit regression (marginal effects) (1) (2) (3)
Focal donor’s phone call (µ1) 0.0937*** 0.0914*** 0.0842***
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0142)
Peer’s phone call (µ2) 0.0461*** 0.0442*** 0.0370**
(0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0146)
Focal donor’s past phone call (µ3) 0.00688 0.00625 0.0140
(0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0142)
Peer’s past phone call (µ4) -0.00729 -0.00888 -0.00104
(0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0139)
174 Location FEs? no yes yes
20 Month FEs? no no yes
# of pairs 5,053 5,053 5,053
# of pair observations 13,421 13,421 13,421
Log likelihood -15,686.86 -15,228.8 -15,173.97
Models additionally include reduced form parameters for X1p, X2p, and a constant.
Household cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Age normalized to sample average.
If there was intertemporal substitution, one would expect the coefficient µ4 to be
significantly negative.
Table 7 displays the regression results. The effects of the focal donor’s and the peer’s
present phone calls on the current donation rate are not influenced by the past phone
calls. The estimated coefficients of the current phone calls are still large and highly
significant. In contrast, the past phone calls have no effect on the current donation rate.
The estimated coefficients are very small and insignificant.
In conclusion, we find no evidence that the spillovers behind the social multiplier are
affected by intertemporal substitution. Hence, the estimated social multiplier does not
produce a drop in donations in the future.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we use a large panel data set with a quasi-randomized phone call to ana-
lyze the role of spillovers in the propensity to donate blood within pairs of pre-registered
donors. We find strong evidence that these spillovers have a forceful impact on donor
motivation, as they generate a social multiplier that amplifies the direct impact of pol-
icy interventions by 70 to 85 percent. Using the phone call as an example of a policy
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intervention, in order to generate an additional 100 blood donations, the BTSRC only
needs to call between 625 and 676 donors, compared to 1149 donors in the absence of
motivational complementarities.
Graham (2011) pointed out that social planning should take the presence of treatment
spillovers into account. This is particularly important in the context of voluntary blood
donations, where more is not always better as blood transfusions cannot be stored in-
definitely and disposal is costly (Garbarino et al. 2017). As our calibration exercise in
subsection 4.3 shows, the number of extra undesired donations caused by spillover effects
can be substantial in a large-scale intervention. Therefore, blood donation services may
want to minimize donations of undesired blood types. Our findings indicate that blood
donation services have to be aware of how encouraging a valuable universal donor might
also increase turnout of donors with undesired blood types. Hence they should target
pairs of donors where both blood types are in high demand.
The policy implications are not confined to voluntary blood donations, but also apply
to other donations in the public health domain such as organ donations (Becker and
Elias 2007; Eames, Holder and Zambrano 2017; Byrne and Thompson 2001) and bone
marrow donations (Bergstrom, Garratt and Sheehan-Connor 2009; Lacetera, Macis and
Stith 2014). Furthermore, the policy implications of such spillovers can go beyond the
health domain to fields such as volunteering, civic engagements, and welfare participation.
Bond et al. (2012) find spillovers on political participation through an online community
that are so strong that the indirect effects in the network are even larger than the direct
effect of the intervention. Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000) find that higher
contact availability in the social networks increases individuals’ welfare participation.
Mechanisms that exploit social networks and social ties are possible routes that could
amplify traditional policy interventions aiming at increasing contributions to such public
goods.
An important concern involves general substitution effects across different domains
of prosocial behaviors. It is possible that increasing activity in one domain leads to
substitution effects in others. Thus, at the societal level, our intervention may be less
beneficial than the analysis of just one domain – blood donations – suggest. No studies we
are aware of is able to identify such substitution effects. A challenge for future research
is to generate accurate measurements of prosocial behaviors in different domains to allow
the identification of such effects. Another avenue for future research is to investigate the
extent to which spillovers in the propensity to donate blood also arise in larger social
networks where the social ties between individuals are arguably weaker than within our
pairs of co-resident couples.
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Goette, Lorenz, Alois Stutzer, Gürcan Yavuzcan and Beat M. Freydur. 2009. “Free
Cholesterol Testing as A Motivation Device in Blood Donations: Evidence from Field
Experiments.” Transfusion 49(March):524–531.
Graham, Bryan S. 2011. Econometric Methods for the Analysis of Assignment Prob-
lems in the Presence of Complementarity and Social Spillovers. In Handbook of social
economics. Vol. 1 Elsevier pp. 965–1052.
Graham, Bryan S. 2016. Identifying and Estimating Neighborhood Effects. Technical
report National Bureau of Economic Research.
Graham, Bryan S and Jinyong Hahn. 2005. “Identification and Estimation of the Linear-
In-Means Model of Social Interactions.” Economics Letters 88(1):1–6.
Greene, William H. 2003. Econometric analysis. Pearson Education India.
Harrison, Glenn W. and Elisabet E. Rutström. 2009. “Representative Agents in Lottery
Choice Experiments: One Wedding and A Decent Funeral.” Experimental Economics
12(2):133–158.
Houser, Daniel, Michael Keane and Kevin McCabe. 2004. “Behavior in a Dynamic De-
cision Problem: An Analysis of Experimental Evidence using a Bayesian Type Classi-
fication Algorithm.” Econometrica 72(3):781–822.
Huber, Peter J. 1967. The Behavior of Maximum Likelihood Estimates under Nonstan-
dard Conditions. In Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical
Statistics and Probability. University of California Press.
Iriberri, Nagore and Pedro Rey-Biel. 2013. “Elicited Beliefs and Social Information in
Modified Dictator Games: What Do Dictators Believe Other Dictators Do.” Quanti-
tative Economics 4(3):515–547.
26
Kessler, Judd B. 2013. “Announcements of Support and Public Good Provision.”.
Kleibergen, Frank and Richard Paap. 2006. “Generalized Reduced Rank Tests Using the
Singular Value Decomposition.” Journal of Econometrics 133(1):97–126.
Lacetera, Nicola, Mario Macis and Robert Slonim. 2012a. “Will There Be Blood? Incen-
tives and Displacement Effects in Pro-Social Behabior.” American Economic Journal
4(1):186–223.
Lacetera, Nicola, Mario Macis and Robert Slonim. 2013. “Economic Rewards to Motivate
Blood Donations.” Science 340(6135):927–928.
Lacetera, Nicola, Mario Macis and Robert Slonim. 2014. “Rewarding Volunteers: A Field
Experiment.” Management Science 60(5):1107–1129.
Lacetera, Nicola, Mario Macis and Sarah S Stith. 2014. “Removing Financial Barriers
to Organ and Bone Marrow Donation: The Effect of Leave and Tax Legislation in the
US.” Journal of health economics 33:43–56.
Lalive, Rafael and M. Alejandra Cattaneo. 2009. “Social Interactions and Schooling
Decisions.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 91(3):457–477.
Lo, Yungtai, Nancy R. Mendell and Donald B. Rubin. 2001. “Testing the Number of
Components in a Normal Mixture.” Biometrika 88(3):767–778.
Manski, Charles F. 1993. “Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection
Problem.” The Review of Economics Studies 60(3):531–542.
Manski, Charles F. 2000. “Economic Analysis of Social Interactions.” The Journal of
Economic Perspectives 14(3):115–136.
McLachlan, Geoffrey and David Peel. 2000. Finite mixture models. John Wiley & Sons.
Moffitt, Robert A. 1999. “New Developments in Econometric Methods for Labor Market
Analysis.” Handbook of Labor Economics 3:1367–1397.
Muthén, Bengt. 2003. “Statistical and Substantive Checking in Growth Mixture Model-
ing: Comment on Bauer and Curran (2003).”.
Niessen-Ruenzi, Alexandra, Martin Weber and David M. Becker. 2014. “To Pay or Not
to Pay-Evidence from Whole Blood Donations in Germany.”.
Reich, Pascale, Paula Roberts, Nancy Laabs, Artina Chinn, Patrick McEvoy, Nora
Hirschler and Edward L Murphy. 2006. “A Randomized Trial of Blood Donor Re-
cruitment Strategies.” Transfusion 46(7):1090–1096.
Slonim, Robert, Carmen Wang and Ellen Garbarino. 2014. “The Market for Blood.” The
Journal of Economic Perspectives pp. 177–196.
27
Sun, Tianshu, Susan Feng Lu and Ginger Zhe Jin. 2016. “Solving Shortage in a Priceless
Market: Insights from Blood Donation.” Journal of health economics 48:149–165.
Volken, Thomas, Andreas Buser, Damiano Castelli, Stefano Fontana, Beat M Frey, Ilka
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In this section, we present a simple model to illustrate how spillovers arising from various
motivational complementarities can increase blood donations and how it is mapped to
our empirical set-up.
We consider a game between two players, denoted player 1 and player 2. Each has
a benefit B from donating blood. The utility of not donating is normalized to zero.
Importantly, there is a behavioral complementarity which can be spillovers arising from
social interactions, joint consumption or any other externalities: If both players donate,
the benefits are increased by b ≥ 0 for each of them. The cost of donating blood is c̃i
that is drawn from a uniform distribution [0, C] for both players.
We further consider two versions of the game. In the first version, each player’s draw
of cost is only known to himself, though the distribution is common knowledge. This
formulation is in keeping with other strategic interactions between connected individuals,
such as the Battle of the Sexes game. In this case, it is a game of incomplete information,
and has a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium with a straightforward interpretation in
terms of our structural model. In particular, in this formulation of the game, individuals
will act in equilibrium as if the propensity to donate directly entered their objective
functions, and the parameter δ can be interpreted in terms of the parameters of the
game. However, one may argue that players can communicate after they observe their
private costs, turning the interaction into a sequential game. We illustrate this in the
second version of the game. In this case, the game has a pure-strategy equilibrium.
However, as we show below, averaging over individuals, this version of the game inherits
all the properties of the first version of the game and also implies that the identification
of the spillover parameter can be achieved as in our empirical model.
Version 1: incomplete information about ci.
In this version of the game, both players decide simultaneously whether or not to donate
without knowing the other player’s strategy. In trying to stay close to the empirical set-
up, assume that player 2 receives a phone call which raises her utility from donating by γ
(e.g. by making the benefits of donating more salient). For the sake of this application,
we assume that player 1 knows about the extra utility γ to the other player. Player 1 will
attend the blood drive if B+p2b−c1 ≥ 0, where p2 is the probability that player 2 will also
go to the blood drive. Similarly, player 2 will attend the blood drive if B+γ+p1b−c2 ≥ 0.
Thus, p2 is given by p2 = Pr(c2 ≤ B + γ + p1b) = Fc(B + γ + p1b), and p1 is given by
p1 = Pr(c1 ≤ B + p2b) = Fc(B + p2b), where Fc is the c.d.f. of the random costs ci.
























It is instructive to define δ ≡ b
C
which, in this setting, corresponds to the probability
that the utility cost of donating blood is less than or equal to the benefit from donating






















To see how spillovers arising from social interactions increase blood donations, consider
the impact of the phone call on the two players’ behavior. Player 2 receives the phone
call, which raises her utility of donating by γ. Holding player 1’s behavior constant,
this translates into a change in player 2’s probability of donating by γ
C
, as can be seen
from equation (A.1). However, player 1’s behavior will not stay constant, since p2 has







, holding player 2’s behavior constant. This, in turn, leads player 2 to
increase her probability of donating by δ2 γ
C
, and so on. The resulting behavioral changes








1−δ2 for player 1, as can be verified in equations
(A.3). Notice that the behavioral impulse to player 1 is scaled down by the factor δ < 1
compared to that of player 2. Thus, the strategic structure put in place by spillovers
arising from social interactions leads player 1 to behave as if she received a motivational
impulse δγ from player 2’s phone call. While the phone call serves as a convenient
analytical example, this is obviously true for any factor affecting either of the players’
utilities. This interpretation of the equilibrium features of the two-person game thus fits
the structure of a bivariate probit model that we define formally and estimate in Section
3.
Notice that, in this setting, the spillover parameter δ is a fraction of b, the additional
payoff if both individuals donate. It can have many different interpretations, such as
utility from spending time together, or a reduced transportation cost from joint travel. It
could also be a social recognition utility or image utility experienced if the other member
of the pair sees her partner donating. Irrespective of the mechanism, this induces behavior
as if the individual were directly affected by the peer’s propensity to donate.
2
Version 2: complete information about ci.
In this version of the game, player 1 will donate if c1 < B, and if he is certain that player
2 will also donate, he will donate also if B < c1 < B + b. Similarly, player 2 will donate
if c1 < B + γ, and if she is certain that player 1 will also donate, she will donate also if
B + γ < c1 < B + b+ γ. Overall, this implies that


















where the second line of the equation exploits the properties of the uniform distribution.
Similarly, for player 2, we have


















As can be seen from equations (A.4) and (A.5), the ratio of the impacts of γ on player
2 compared to player 1 again identifies the spillover effect δ ≡ b/C, as in the case with
incomplete information. Thus, in a game with complete information, the same behavioral
pattern that leads to a policy multiplier emerges.
To understand the logic, it is useful to consider the example of, say, a husband and
wife. Assume that the wife receives a phone call, which raises her benefit from donating.
For a range of cost draws, this is not enough to induce her to donate alone. However for
a range of cost draws for the husband B < c2 < B+ b, she knows that if she donates, her
husband will donate too. If B+γ < c1 < B+γ+b, this will make her net benefit positive
(because it adds the payoff b) and tips her to donate blood. In turn, this also induces the
husband to donate blood. Thus, the spillovers are present in this sequential example as
well: the phone call to the wife induces the husband to donate. Moreover, the presence
of the husband amplifies the effectiveness of the phone call on the wife’s propensity to
donate, just like in the simultaneous model.
As our analytical example above shows, averaging over the population of donors and
all possible cost draws again leads individuals to behave as if motivation spilled over
between donors. As it turns out, this produces exactly the same policy multiplier.
A.2 TSLS Estimation of the Spillovers Arising from Social In-
teractions
We apply the basic TSLS procedure to estimate spillovers arising from social interactions
in a linear probability model (Moffitt 1999). In the first stage, we predict the peer’s dona-
3
tion, Ŷ2pt, using the instrumental variable, P2pt, and all exogenous variables by estimating
the following linear model22:
Y2pt = η0 + η1P2pt + η2P1pt + η3X2pt + η4X1pt + ε2pt . (A.6)
In the second stage, we regress the other focal donor’s decision to donate blood, Y1pt, on
the peer’s predicted donation, Ŷ2pt, and all exogenous variables:
Y1pt = φ0 + φ1P1pt + φ2X1pt + φ3X2pt + φ4Ŷ2pt + ε1pt . (A.7)
Table 9 reports the estimated second-stage coefficients for three different specifications.
Column (1) shows the estimated coefficients without any fixed effects, column (2) includes
location fixed effects, and column (3) additionally includes month fixed effects. In sum,
the linear probability model yields qualitatively the same results as the bivariate probit
model.
Donors who receive a phone call are about 10 percentage points more likely to donate
blood than donors who do not receive such a phone call. As in the bivariate probit model,
this effect is highly statistically significant and robust. The instrument easily passes the
standard tests for strong instruments (Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F-statistics in the first
stage: (1) 44.62, (2) 41.78, (3) 34.23). Thus, in terms of the effectiveness of the phone
call, the TSLS estimates are virtually identical to the marginal effects obtained from our
baseline specification.
We observe strong and significant spillovers arising from social interactions which are
robust to fixed effects. A focal donor’s probability to donate blood increases by about 47
percentage points if her peer donates. In this model, again, the social multiplier is given
by 1/(1− φ4). With a value of about 1.89, it is in line with the bivariate probit model.
The estimated influence of individual characteristics on donation rates is robust and
comparable to the bivariate probit model too. Given a positive baseline donation rate of
32 percent, men are about 4 percentage points more likely to donate blood than women.
This effect is statistically highly significant and robust. Donation rates increase with age.
On average, a donor that is 10 years older donates 4 percentage points more often than
the younger donor. Hence, in terms of magnitude, the influence of gender corresponds
to an 10-year age effect. Furthermore, a regular donor is more likely to donate than
an irregular or an inactive donor. Similar to the bivariate probit model, the effects of
previous donations are much stronger than gender and age effects. This indicates that
past unobservables strongly influence donor motivation. Blood types do not affect the
donors’ motivation (F-test for joint significance, p-values > 0.4 in all specifications).
Individuals with highly demanded, negative blood types do not exhibit higher donation
22Results of the first stage regression are reported in table 8.
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Table 8: Linear probability model (first stage regressions)
Binary dependent variable: peer’s donation decision (0,1)
OLS regression (1) (2) (3)
Constant (η0) 0.157***
(0.0117)
Peer’s phone 0.101*** 0.0978*** 0.0900***
call (η1) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0154)
Focal donor’s phone 0.0468*** 0.0440*** 0.0362**
call (η2) (0.0146) (0.0149) (0.0151)
Peer’s characteristics (η3)
Male 0.0405*** 0.0372*** 0.0373***
(0.00795) (0.00778) (0.00779)
Age 0.00387*** 0.00390*** 0.00389***
(0.000263) (0.000258) (0.000258)
# of donations in year before study
1 0.167*** 0.170*** 0.175***
(0.00760) (0.00753) (0.00759)
2 0.306*** 0.321*** 0.324***
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103)
3 0.386*** 0.425*** 0.428***
(0.0207) (0.0214) (0.0213)
4 0.315*** 0.360*** 0.349***
(0.0722) (0.0666) (0.0677)
Blood Types
O- 0.00312 0.00378 0.00852
(0.0176) (0.0173) (0.0174)
A+ -0.00842 -0.00706 -0.00714
(0.00722) (0.00702) (0.00703)
A- -0.00438 0.000602 0.00259
(0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0129)
Focal donor’s characteristics (η4)
Male 0.00787 0.00461 0.00470
(0.00795) (0.00776) (0.00778)
Age -0.000545** -0.000508* -0.000523**
(0.000267) (0.000262) (0.000263)
# of donations in year before study
1 -0.0109 -0.00771 -0.00294
(0.00788) (0.00777) (0.00781)
2 -0.00364 0.0115 0.0145
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101)
3 -0.00794 0.0313 0.0339*
(0.0203) (0.0205) (0.0206)
4 0.0276 0.0728 0.0620
(0.106) (0.0965) (0.0976)
Blood Types
O- -0.0164 -0.0157 -0.0110
(0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0163)
A+ 0.000137 0.00149 0.00141
5
(0.00729) (0.00707) (0.00708)
A- -0.0257** -0.0208 -0.0188
(0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0127)
F-tests of instrument 44.62 41.78 34.23
174 Location FEs? no yes yes
20 Month FEs? no no yes
# of individual observations 26,842 26,842 26,842
# of pairs 5,053 5,053 5,053
Household cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Age normalized to sample average.
rates (F-test for joint significance, p-values > 0.6 in all specifications).
Table 9 also shows some evidence that the peer’s characteristics influence the focal
donor’s motivation to donate. Namely, increasing the peer’s age by one year significantly
decreases the probability to donate by 0.2 percentage points. Furthermore, the coefficients
on the donation frequency in the year before the study reveal that donors living with
irregular donors are more likely to donate than donors living with regular donors. In
sum, we provide some evidence that focal donors also react to the peer’s exogenous
characteristics, besides her immediate motivation to donate. The fact that there are
some significant relationships confirms that controlling for exogenous effects is crucial
when attempting to identify the effect of spillovers arising from social interactions.
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Table 9: Linear probability model (second stage regressions)
Binary dependent variable: donation decision (0,1)
OLS regression (1) (2) (3)
Phone call (φ1) 0.0789*** 0.0781*** 0.0755***
(0.0209) (0.0205) (0.0194)




Focal donor’s characteristics (φ2)
Male 0.0368*** 0.0351*** 0.0354***
(0.00608) (0.00600) (0.00614)
Age 0.00412*** 0.00413*** 0.00410***
(0.000297) (0.000295) (0.000292)
# of donations in year before study
1 0.172*** 0.173*** 0.176***
(0.00855) (0.00845) (0.00826)
2 0.307*** 0.316*** 0.318***
(0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0113)
3 0.390*** 0.411*** 0.414***
(0.0213) (0.0220) (0.0220)
4 0.302*** 0.327*** 0.324***
(0.0424) (0.0446) (0.0458)
Blood Types
O- 0.0107 0.0108 0.0129
(0.0187) (0.0184) (0.0180)
A+ -0.00848 -0.00773 -0.00771
(0.00692) (0.00688) (0.00683)
A- 0.00758 0.00993 0.0101
(0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0130)
Peer’s characteristics (φ3)
Male -0.0109 -0.0121 -0.0103
(0.00844) (0.00822) (0.00865)
Age -0.00234*** -0.00226*** -0.00209***
(0.000650) (0.000672) (0.000711)
# of donations in year before study
1 -0.0884*** -0.0841*** -0.0731**
(0.0264) (0.0277) (0.0304)
2 -0.146*** -0.133*** -0.116**
(0.0470) (0.0509) (0.0552)
3 -0.187*** -0.160** -0.138*
(0.0618) (0.0695) (0.0748)
4 -0.119 -0.0890 -0.0783
(0.0943) (0.0952) (0.0987)
Blood types
O- -0.0178 -0.0174 -0.0144
(0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0172)
A+ 0.00405 0.00466 0.00428
7
(0.00716) (0.00705) (0.00702)
A- -0.0237** -0.0210* -0.0198
(0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0123)
F-statistics of instrument (1. Stage) 44.62 41.78 34.23
F-tests for joint significance (p-values)
Focal donor:
all blood types 0.48 0.47 0.43
negative blood types 0.80 0.72 0.66
non O-negative blood types 0.33 0.31 0.30
Peer:
all characteristics 0.02 0.02 0.07
previous donations 0.02 0.02 0.09
all blood types 0.16 0.23 0.31
negative blood types 0.13 0.20 0.26
174 Location FEs? no yes yes
20 Month FEs? no no yes
# of individual observations 26,842 26,842 26,842
# of pairs 5,053 5,053 5,053
Household cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Age normalized to sample average.
A.3 Testing for Behavioral Heterogeneity
To explore whether there is behavioral heterogeneity in the sense that there may exist
distinct types of pairs that differ in the extent and type of social interaction, we estimate
a finite mixture model.23 As pointed out before, an estimated 48 percent of our donors are
couples living together, and it is possible that social ties with regard to blood donations
are stronger within couples than among other tenants. Moreover, prosocial behavior is
known to be heterogeneous (e.g. Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001)), as there may
exist several distinct social preference types (Breitmoser 2013; Iriberri and Rey-Biel 2013;
Bruhin, Fehr and Schunk 2016; Bruhin et al. 2015). Thus, extending the pooled bivariate
probit model to account for behavioral heterogeneity could yield important additional
insights.
Estimation
The finite mixture model relaxes the assumption that there exists just one representative
pair in the population. Instead, it allows the population to be made up by K distinct
types of pairs differing in the extent of social interaction. The parameter vector θk is no
23Finite mixture models have become increasingly popular to uncover latent heterogeneity in various
fields of behavioral economics. For recent examples, see Houser, Keane and McCabe (2004); Harrison
and Rutström (2009); Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper (2010); Conte, Hey and Moffat (2011); Breitmoser
(2013); Bruhin et al. (2015).
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longer representative of all pairs but rather depends on the type of the pairs as indicated
by the subscript k. Thus, pair p’s contribution to the likelihood of the finite mixture
model,
`(θk;Pp, Xp, Yp) =
K∑
k=1
πk f(θk;Pp, Xp, Yp) , (A.8)
equals the sum over allK type-specific densities, f(θk;Pp, Xp, Yp), weighted by the relative
sizes of the corresponding types πk. Since the finite mixture model makes no assumptions
about how type-membership is related to observable characteristics, we do not know a
priori to which type pair p belongs. Hence, the types’ relative sizes, πk, may be interpreted
as ex-ante probabilities of type-membership, and the log likelihood of the finite mixture
model is given by






πk f(θk;Pp, Xp, Yp) , (A.9)
where the vector Ψ = (π1, . . . , πK−1, θ
′
1, . . . , θ
′
K)
′ contains all parameters of the model.
Once we obtained the parameter estimates of the finite mixture model, Ψ̂, we can
classify each pair into the type it most likely belongs to. In particular, we apply Bayes’
rule to calculate the pair’s ex-post probabilities of type-membership given the parameter
estimates of the finite mixture model,
τpk =
π̂kf(θ̂k;Pp, Xp, Yp)∑K
m=1 π̂mf(θ̂k;Pp, Xp, Yp)
. (A.10)
Note that the true number of distinct types in the population is unknown. Thus, a
crucial part of estimating a finite mixture model is to determine the optimal number of
distinct types, K∗, that the model accounts for. On the one hand, if K is too small, the
model is not flexible enough to capture all the essential behavioral heterogeneity in the
data. On the other hand, if K is too large, the finite mixture model overfits the data and
captures random noise, resulting in an ambiguous classification of pairs into overlapping
types. However, determining K∗ is difficult for the following two reasons:
1. Due to the nonlinear form of the log likelihood (equation A.9), there exist no stan-
dard tests for K∗ that exhibit a test statistic with a known distribution (McLachlan
and Peel 2000). 24
2. Standard model selection criteria, such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
or the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), are not applicable either as they tend
to favor models with too many types (Atkinson 1981; Geweke and Meese 1981;
24Lo, Mendell and Rubin (2001) proposed a statistical test (LMR-test) to select among finite mixture
models with varying numbers of types, which is based on Vuong (1989)’s test for non-nested models.
However, the LMR-test is unlikely to be suitable when the alternative model is a single-type model with
strongly non-normal outcomes (Muthén 2003).
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Table 10: ICL-BIC for determining the optimal number of types in a finite mixture
model
K∗ = 1 K = 2 K = 3
ICL-BIC 31,276.03 35,674.33 37,462.88
BIC 31,276.03 30,982.93 30,706.61
Entropy 0 4,691.4 6,756.27
Celeux and Soromenho 1996; Biernacki, Celeux and Govaert 2000b).
To determine the optimal number of distinct types, K∗, we approximate the Normal-
ized Integrate Complete Likelihood (Biernacki, Celeux and Govaert 2000a) by applying







The ICL-BIC is based on the BIC, but additionally features an entropy term that acts
as a penalty for an ambiguous classification of pairs into types. If the classification is
clean, the K types are well segregated and almost all pairs exhibit ex-post probabilities
of type-membership, τk, that are all either close to 0 or 1. In that case, the entropy
term is almost 0 and the ICL-BIC nearly coincides with the BIC. However, if the
classification is ambiguous, some of the K types overlap and many pairs exhibit ex-post
probabilities of type-membership in the vicinity of 1/K. In that case, the absolute value
of the entropy term is large, indicating that the finite mixture model overfits the data
and tries to identify types that do not exist. Thus, to determine the optimal number of
types, we need to minimize the ICL-BIC with respect to K.
Results
The estimates of the finite mixture model provide no evidence for the existence of different
types of pairs with distinct behavioral patterns. As shown in Table 10, the ICL-BIC
reaches its lowest value for a model with K∗ = 1, i.e., one representative type. In
particular, the ambiguity in the classification of pairs into types, as measured by the
entropy in the ICL-BIC, is very large for models with more than one type. Hence, these
models are overspecified and fit random noise rather than distinct types of pairs.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the ex-post probabilities of type-membership, τpk,
for a finite mixture model with K = 2 types. It reveals that the classification of pairs
into types is indeed highly ambiguous as the τpk of many pairs lie between 0 and 1. Thus,
there is considerable overlap between the two types that the model tries to identify. As
illustrated in Figure 4, the ambiguity in the pairs’ classification into types becomes even
more pronounced in the finite mixture model with K = 3 types. Therefore, our results
10






































Figure 3: Ex-post probabilities of type-membership: model with K = 2 types























































Figure 4: Ex-post probabilities of type-membership: model with K = 3 types
indicate that the baseline specification is a valid and parsimonious representation of the
data. For completeness, we report the estimates for the finite mixture model with K = 2
types in Table 11.
11
Table 11: Finite mixture model with K = 2 types
Binary dependent variable: donation decision (0,1)
Bivariate probit regression Type 1 Type 2
Individual Individual
Phone call (γk) 0.241 0.200*
(0.196) (0.111)
Spillovers arising from social interactions (δk) 0.495 0.355
(0.449) (0.440)
Constant (β0k) -0.267 -1.079
(0.284) (0.777)











































ρk (correlation between errors -0.582 -0.143
in the structural form) (0.762) (0.958)
πk (share among the population) 0.366 0.634
(0.107) (0.107)
174 Location FEs? yes
20 Month FEs? yes
# of pair observations 13,421
# of pairs 5,053
Log likelihood -14,369.93
Household cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Age normalized to sample average.
A.4 Recovering Parameters from the Reduced Form
Express equation 3.8 as
Y1p = α0 + α1P1p + α2P2p + α3X1p + α4X2p + v1 (A.11)
Taking the ratio of the coefficients of P2p and P1p yields
δ = α2/α1,
γ = α1(1− δ2) = α1 − α22/α1.
δ has a direct interpretation as marginal effect because when dividing two reduced form
coefficients, the density of the bivariate probit distribution cancels out. Once δ is identi-
fied, the other parameters can be derived too:
β0 = α0(1− δ2)/(1 + δ) = α0(1− (α2/α1)2)/(1 + (α2/α1))
β1 = α3 − δα4 = α3 − (α2/α1)α4
β2 = α4 − δα3 = α4 − (α2/α1)α3
















































































se(δ) = [∇(δ)′ × Cov(α1, α2)×∇(δ)]1/2
se(γ) = [∇(γ)′ × Cov(α1, α2)×∇(γ)]1/2
se(β0) = [∇(β0)′ × Cov(α0, α1, α2)×∇(β0)]1/2
se(β1) = [∇(β1)′ × Cov(α1, α2, α3, α4)×∇(β1)]1/2
se(β2) = [∇(β2)′ × Cov(α1, α2, α3, α4)×∇(β2)]1/2
A.5 Marginal Effects in the Bivariate Probit Model
Define Zp = (Pp, Y
∗
p , Xp), ζ = (γ, δ, β
′)′. The discrete probability effect of the phone call












The change in the probability of donation of the focal donor receiving the phone call, and







− Φ(ζ ′Zp) , (A.13)
where 1/(1 − δ2) is the social amplification for the focal donor. Similarly, the effect on







− Φ(ζ ′Zp) , (A.14)
where δ/(1− δ2) is the spillover onto the peer who has not received the phone call.
A.6 Bivariate Probit Model Without Correlation Between the
Residuals
Table 12: Bivariate probit model with ρ = 0
Binary dependent variable: donation decision (0,1)
Bivariate probit regression (1) (2) (3)
Phone call (γ) 0.215*** 0.220*** 0.212***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.059)
Spillovers arising from social interactions (δ) 0.489*** 0.477*** 0.434**
(0.156) (0.159) (0.173)
Constant (β0) -0.512*** -0.674*** -0.659***
(0.157) (0.224) (0.236)
Focal donor’s characteristics (β1)
Male 0.116*** 0.113*** 0.115***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Age 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# of donations in year before study
1 0.543*** 0.562*** 0.570***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
2 0.901*** 0.953*** 0.962***
(0.033) (0.035) (0.035)
3 1.116*** 1.206*** 1.218***
(0.059) (0.063) (0.063)
4 0.908*** 1.004*** 0.995***
(0.111) (0.125) (0.126)
Blood types
O- 0.037 0.036 0.045
(0.055) (0.055) (0.054)
A+ -0.025 -0.023 -0.023
15
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
A- 0.032 0.045 0.046
(0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
Peer’s characteristics (β2)
Male -0.038 -0.044* -0.038
(0.027) (0.026) (0.028)
Age -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
# donations in year before study
1 -0.287*** -0.280*** -0.249**
(0.087) (0.092) (0.102)
2 -0.452*** -0.428*** -0.382**
(0.143) (0.157) (0.172)
3 -0.568*** -0.502** -0.446**
(0.182) (0.209) (0.227)
4 -0.417 -0.338 -0.308
(0.301) (0.309) (0.320)
Blood Types
O- -0.057 -0.057 -0.049
(0.050) (0.051) (0.053)
A+ 0.011 0.012 0.011
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
A- -0.079** -0.079** -0.075*
(0.038) (0.040) (0.040)
ρ (correlation between errors 0.000 0.000 0.000
in the structural form)
Wald-tests for joint significance (p-values)
Focal donor
all blood types 0.42 0.38 0.35
negative blood types 0.69 0.57 0.55
non O-negative blood types 0.28 0.23 0.22
Peer:
all characteristics 0.03 0.05 0.16
previous donations 0.03 0.02 0.12
all blood types 0.13 0.16 0.23
negative blood types 0.10 0.12 0.16
174 Location FEs? no yes yes
20 Month FEs? no no yes
# of pair observations 13,421 13,421 13,421
# of pairs 5,031 5,031 5,031
Log likelihood -15,705.81 -15,247.68 -15,193.15
Household cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Age normalized to sample average.
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